Exits from Heavily Managed Exchange Rate Regimes
A widely held nostrum is that countries should exit heavily managed exchange rate regimes when the going is good, rather than when the exchange rate is under pressure to depreciate. Have countries followed this advice in practice? And, if so, how good has the going been? We find that in the past 25 years or so, almost all exits to more flexible regimes were followed by a depreciation of the exchange rate, and that exits were about evenly divided between disorderly and orderly cases. A logit econometric model, indicates that the general circumstances of orderly and disorderly exits have been broadly similar: an overvalued real exchange rate, falling reserves, a difficult fiscal position, and high world interest rates. Wellestablished pegs were less likely to end.
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- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004.
"The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 119(1), pages 1-48.
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2002. "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation," NBER Working Papers 8963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2004. "The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: A reinterpretation," MPRA Paper 14070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Klein, Michael W. & Marion, Nancy P., 1997. "Explaining the duration of exchange-rate pegs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 387-404, December.
- Michael W. Klein & Nancy P. Marion, 1994. "Explaining the Duration of Exchange-Rate Pegs," NBER Working Papers 4651, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ahmet Asici & Charles Wyplosz, 2003. "The Art of Gracefully Exiting a Peg," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 34(3), pages 211-228.
- Asici, Ahmet & Wyplosz, Charles, 2003. "The Art of Gracefully Exiting a Peg," MPRA Paper 4432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
- Pierre-Richard Agenor, 2004. "Orderly exits from adjustable pegs and exchange rate bands," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 83-108.
- Inci Ã–tker & Rupa Duttagupta, 2003. "Exits From Pegged Regimes; An Empirical Analysis," IMF Working Papers 03/147, International Monetary Fund. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)