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Financial Sector Conditionality: Is tougher Better?

  • Roger P. Kronenberg
  • Alessandro Giustiniani
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    The aim of this paper is to take a closer look at IMF conditionality in the banking sector. Our analysis shows that while such conditionality became more stringent following the Asian crisis, compliance has remained broadly unchanged, comparing unfavorably with other structural reforms. The results of panel data regressions show that while compliance with IMF-supported banking sector reform strategies has contributed to an improvement in banking sector performance, increases in the hardness and intensity of IMF conditionality may not be, ceteris paribus, effective. The policy implication is that the IMF should, therefore, continue its efforts in enhancing countries'' ownership and streamlining conditionality.

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    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=18657
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    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 05/230.

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    Length: 34
    Date of creation: 01 Dec 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/230
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    1. Morris Goldstein & Timothy F. Geithner & Paul Keating & Yung Chul Park, 2003. "IMF Structural Programs," NBER Chapters, in: Economic and Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies, pages 363-458 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Marc Quintyn & David S. Hoelscher, 2003. "Managing Systemic Banking Crises," IMF Occasional Papers 224, International Monetary Fund.
    3. James M. Boughton, 2003. "Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs," IMF Working Papers 03/191, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Walter B. Wriston, 1998. "Dumb Networks and Smart Capital," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), Winter.
    5. Ross Levine, 2004. "Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 10766, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Charalambos Christofides & Atish R. Ghosh & Uma Ramakrishnan & Alun H. Thomas & Laura Papi & Juan Zalduendo & Jun Il Kim, 2005. "The Design of IMF-Supported Programs," IMF Occasional Papers 241, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Alex Mourmouras & Anna Ivanova & George C. Anayotos & Wolfgang Mayer, 2003. "What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs?," IMF Working Papers 03/8, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Stefan N. Ingves & Steven A. Seelig & Dong He, 2004. "Issues in the Establishment of Asset Management Companies," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 04/3, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Charles W. Calomiris, 1998. "The IMF's Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), pages 275-294, Winter.
    10. Ariel BUIRA, 2003. "An Analysis Of Imf Conditionality," G-24 Discussion Papers 22, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
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