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The Political Economy of Revenue-Forecasting Experience From Low-Income Countries

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  • Stephan Danninger
  • Annette J Kyobe
  • M. Cangiano

Abstract

This paper analyzes interference and timeliness in the revenue-forecasting process, using new data on revenue-forecasting practices in low-income countries. Interference is defined as the occurrence of a significant deviation from purely technical forecasts. A theoretical model explains forecasting interference through government corruption. The data broadly supports the model, and the results are robust to alternative explanations. The paper also constructs three indices-transparency, formality, and organizational simplicity-that characterize revenue-forecasting practices, and assesses their effectiveness in producing an upfront-that is, timely-budget envelope. More transparent and simple forecasting processes lead to early budget constraints, while formality has no measurable effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephan Danninger & Annette J Kyobe & M. Cangiano, 2005. "The Political Economy of Revenue-Forecasting Experience From Low-Income Countries," IMF Working Papers 05/2, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Stephan Danninger, 2005. "Revenue Forecasts as Performance Targets," IMF Working Papers 05/14, International Monetary Fund.
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    15. Annette J Kyobe & Stephan Danninger, 2005. "Revenue Forecasting—How is it done? Results from a Survey of Low-Income Countries," IMF Working Papers 05/24, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabrizio Balassone & Maura Francese & Stefania Zotteri, 2010. "Cyclical asymmetry in fiscal variables in the EU," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 381-402, November.
    2. Beate Jochimsen & Robert Lehmann, 2017. "On the political economy of national tax revenue forecasts: evidence from OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 211-230, March.
    3. Fabrizio Balassone & Maura Francese & Stefania Zotteri, 2008. "Cyclical asymmetry in fiscal variables," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 671, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    4. Florian Chatagny & Nils Soguel, 2012. "The effect of tax revenue budgeting errors on fiscal balance: evidence from the Swiss cantons," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(3), pages 319-337, June.
    5. Annette J Kyobe & Stephan Danninger, 2005. "Revenue Forecasting—How is it done? Results from a Survey of Low-Income Countries," IMF Working Papers 05/24, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Brima Ibrahim Baimba Kargbo & Adegbemi Festus O. Egwaikhide, 2012. "Tax Elasticity in Sierra Leone: A Time Series Approach," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 2(4), pages 432-447.
    7. Beate Jochimsen & Robert Lehmann, 2017. "On the political economy of national tax revenue forecasts: evidence from OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 211-230, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Political economy; Revenue forecasting; forecasting bias; forecasting; revenue forecast; survey; budget preparation; Taxation; Subsidies; and Revenue: General;

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