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Governance Structures and Decision-Making Roles in Inflation-Targeting Central Banks

  • Anita Tuladhar
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    This paper surveys decision-making roles of governing bodies of central banks that have formally adopted inflation targeting as a monetary framework. Governance practices seek to balance institutional independence needed for monetary policy credibility with accountability required to protect democratic values. Central bank laws usually have price stability as the primary monetary policy objective but seldom require an explicit numerical inflation target. Governments are frequently involved in setting targets, but to ensure operational autonomy, legal provisions explicitly limit government influence in internal policy decision-making processes. Internal governance practices differ considerably with regard to the roles and inter-relationships between the policy, supervisory, and management boards of a central bank.

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    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 05/183.

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    Length: 27
    Date of creation: 01 Sep 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/183
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    1. Marta Campillo & Jeffrey A. Miron, 1996. "Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries?," NBER Working Papers 5540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Carlo Cottarelli & Curzio Giannini, 1997. "Credibility Without Rules," IMF Occasional Papers 154, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Stanley Fischer, 1995. "Modern Approaches to Central Banking," NBER Working Papers 5064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Marc Zelmer & Andrea Schaechter & Mark R. Stone & Alina Carare, 2002. "Establishing Initial Conditions in Support of Inflation Targeting," IMF Working Papers 02/102, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
    6. Frederic Mishkin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002. "A Decade of Inflation Targeting in the World: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Raimundo Soto & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series Editor) (ed.), Inflation Targeting: Desing, Performance, Challenges, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 4, pages 171-220 Central Bank of Chile.
    7. Murray Sherwin., 2000. "Institutional frameworks for inflation targeting?," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 63, December.
    8. Tomás J. T. Baliño & Charles Enoch & William E. Alexander, 1995. "The Adoption of Indirect Instruments of Monetary Policy," IMF Occasional Papers 126, International Monetary Fund.
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