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Who Controls the Budget; The Legislature or the Executive?

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  • Ian Lienert

Abstract

Country-specific factors prevent a strong linear relationship between the legislature's budgetary powers and the extent of its separation from the executive. Electoral and voting systems, bicameralism, constitutional and legal constraints, voluntary contracts of political parties, and long-standing traditions all influence the relative budgetary powers of executives and legislatures. Differences in the legislature's budgetary authority in twenty-eight countries with five different forms of government are examined. It is concluded that differences in budgetary powers within a particular form of government are as great as those between different forms of government.

Suggested Citation

  • Ian Lienert, 2005. "Who Controls the Budget; The Legislature or the Executive?," IMF Working Papers 05/115, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ian Lienert, 2003. "A Comparison Between Two Public Expenditure Management Systems in Africa," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 3(3), pages 35-66.
    2. W. Krafchik & J. Wehner, 1998. "The Role of Parliament in the Budgetary Process," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 66(4), pages 242-255, December.
    3. Ian Lienert, 2003. "A Comparison Between Two Public Expenditure Management Systems in Africa," IMF Working Papers 03/2, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Luc E. Leruth & Dominique Bouley & Jerome Fournel, 2002. "How Do Treasury Systems Operate in Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa?," IMF Working Papers 02/58, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Meyer, Steven A & Naka, Shigeto, 1998. "Legislative Influences in Japanese Budgetary Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 267-288, March.
    6. George Kopits & Steven A. Symansky, 1998. "Fiscal Policy Rules," IMF Occasional Papers 162, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Steven Meyer & Shigeto Naka, 1998. "Legislative influences in Japanese budgetary politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 267-288, March.
    8. Tsebelis, George, 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(03), pages 289-325, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Barry Eichengreen, 2010. "The Breakup of the Euro Area," NBER Chapters,in: Europe and the Euro, pages 11-51 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Abidemi C. Adegboye & Joel Edafe & Samuel Iweriebor, 2016. "Budget And Political Institutions And Budgetary Performance," Oradea Journal of Business and Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(2), pages 72-82, September.
    3. World Bank, 2008. "Costa Rica - Public Expenditure Review : Enhancing the Efficiency of Expenditures," World Bank Other Operational Studies 8122, The World Bank.
    4. Ian Lienert, 2007. "British Influences on Commonwealth Budget Systems; The Case of the United Republic of Tanzania," IMF Working Papers 07/78, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Hallerberg, Mark & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,35, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
    6. repec:jle:journl:125 is not listed on IDEAS

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