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Who Controls the Budget; The Legislature or the Executive?

  • Ian Lienert
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    Country-specific factors prevent a strong linear relationship between the legislature's budgetary powers and the extent of its separation from the executive. Electoral and voting systems, bicameralism, constitutional and legal constraints, voluntary contracts of political parties, and long-standing traditions all influence the relative budgetary powers of executives and legislatures. Differences in the legislature's budgetary authority in twenty-eight countries with five different forms of government are examined. It is concluded that differences in budgetary powers within a particular form of government are as great as those between different forms of government.

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    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 05/115.

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    Length: 26
    Date of creation: 01 Jun 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/115
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    1. Steven Meyer & Shigeto Naka, 1998. "Legislative influences in Japanese budgetary politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 267-288, March.
    2. Luc E. Leruth & Dominique Bouley & J. Fournel, 2002. "How Do Treasury Systems Operate in Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa?," IMF Working Papers 02/58, International Monetary Fund.
    3. W. Krafchik & J. Wehner, 1998. "The Role of Parliament in the Budgetary Process," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 66(4), pages 242-255, December.
    4. George Kopits & Steven A. Symansky, 1998. "Fiscal Policy Rules," IMF Occasional Papers 162, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Ian Lienert, 2003. "A Comparison Between Two Public Expenditure Management Systems in Africa," IMF Working Papers 03/2, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Meyer, Steven A & Naka, Shigeto, 1998. " Legislative Influences in Japanese Budgetary Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 267-88, March.
    7. Ian Lienert, 2003. "A Comparison Between Two Public Expenditure Management Systems in Africa," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 3(3), pages 35-66.
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