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Robust Versus Optimal Rules in Monetary Policy; A Note

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  • International Monetary Fund

Abstract

We provide a framework for analyzing the choice between optimal and robust monetary policy rules in the presence of paradigm uncertainty. We first discuss the conditions on uncertainty that render a robust rule preferable to an optimal rule. Second, we show how the degree of risk aversion of the policymaker increases the region in which the robust rule is preferred.

Suggested Citation

  • International Monetary Fund, 2004. "Robust Versus Optimal Rules in Monetary Policy; A Note," IMF Working Papers 04/96, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:04/96
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrew Levin & Volker Wieland & John C. Williams, 2003. "The Performance of Forecast-Based Monetary Policy Rules Under Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 622-645, June.
    2. Glenn Rudebusch & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1999. "Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting," NBER Chapters,in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 203-262 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Nicoletta Batini & Andrew Haldane, 1999. "Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters,in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 157-202 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rockett, Katharine E, 1988. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 318-340, June.
    5. John B. Taylor, 1999. "Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number tayl99-1, January.
    6. Holtham, Gerald & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1992. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1043-1051, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laxton, Douglas & Pesenti, Paolo & Juillard, Michel & Karam, Philippe, 2006. "Welfare-based monetary policy rules in an estimated DSGE model of the US economy," Working Paper Series 613, European Central Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central banks and their policies; Monetary policy; Model Uncertainty; Policy Rules; central bank; probability; monetary policy rules; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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