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Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture

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  • Olivier D Jeanne

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture. It presents a general equilibrium model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises owing to bad shocks. The paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates, such as the adoption of renegotiation-friendly clauses in debt contracts and the establishment of an international bankruptcy regime for sovereigns.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier D Jeanne, 2004. "Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture," IMF Working Papers 04/137, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:04/137
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    Cited by:

    1. Niepelt, Dirk, 2014. "Debt maturity without commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(S), pages 37-54.
    2. Küçük, Ugur N., 2009. "Emerging Market Local Currency Bond Market, Too Risky to Invest?," MPRA Paper 21878, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Fernando A. Broner & Guido Lorenzoni & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2013. "Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11, pages 67-100, January.
    4. Weinschelbaum, Federico & Wynne, Jose, 2005. "Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 47-72.
    5. Ghosal, Sayantan & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2013. "Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 68-78.
    6. Aitor Erce, 2012. "Does the IMF´s official support affect sovereign bond maturities?," Working Papers 1231, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    7. Laura Alfaro & Fabio Kanczuk, 2009. "Debt Maturity: Is Long-Term Debt Optimal?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 890-905, November.
    8. Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2015. "Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 68-82.
    9. Juan Carlos Gozzi & Ross Levine & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2012. "How Firms Use Domestic and International Corporate Bond Markets," NBER Working Papers 17763, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Bolton, Patrick & Jeanne, Olivier, 2005. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority," CEPR Discussion Papers 4901, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Basil Dalamagas & Stefanos Tantos, 2016. "Optimal Versus Actual Maturity of Government Debt: The Case of Greece," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 66(3), pages 25-52, July-Sept.
    12. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2014. "A Decade of Debt," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Miguel Fuentes D. & Claudio E. Raddatz & Carmen M. Reinhart (ed.), Capital Mobility and Monetary Policy, edition 1, volume 18, chapter 4, pages 97-135 Central Bank of Chile.
    13. Hector Butts, 2009. "Short Term External Debt and Economic Growth—Granger Causality: Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 93-111, June.
    14. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-698, September.
    15. Laura Alfaro & Fabio Kanczuk, 2006. "Sovereign Debt: Indexation and Maturity," Research Department Publications 4459, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    16. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 1-5.
    17. Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean, 2015. "Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops," CEPR Discussion Papers 11024, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Alexandre Cunha, 2013. "On the relevance of floating exchange rate policies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(2), pages 357-382, June.
    19. Wang, Zigan & Zhu, Youwei, 2011. "A dynamic model of house price," MPRA Paper 34395, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 29 Oct 2011.
    20. Gozzi, Juan Carlos & Levine, Ross & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2015. "How firms use corporate bond markets under financial globalization," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 532-551.
    21. Sebastian M. Saiegh, 2009. "Coalition Governments And Sovereign Debt Crises," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 232-254, July.
    22. Benmelech, Efraim & Dvir, Eyal, 2013. "Does Short-Term Debt Increase Vulnerability to Crisis? Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 485-494.
    23. Laura Alfaro & Fabio Kanczuk, 2006. "Deuda soberana: indexación y vencimiento," Research Department Publications 4460, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    24. Aitor Erce, 2012. "Does the IMF's official support affect sovereign bonds maturities?," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 128, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic models; External debt; Insolvency; International financial system; Sovereign debt; debt contract; international financial architecture; debt contracts; International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions; International Lending and Debt Problems; Short-term Debt; Collective Action Clause; International Bankruptcy Court;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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