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Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence; Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean


  • Eva Gutierrez


This paper explores the relationship between the constitutional entrenchment of central bank independence and inflation performance. Empirical studies for developing countries have not found a relationship between central bank independence, proxied by the "de jure" independence established in the central bank law, and inflation. We argue that the constitution is likely to be better enforced than ordinary statutes owing to its higher legal rank. Our empirical analysis finds that in a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries, those countries that entrench the independence of the central bank in the constitution have a better inflation performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Eva Gutierrez, 2003. "Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence; Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean," IMF Working Papers 03/53, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:03/53

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jakob De Haan & Clemens L.J. Siermann, 1996. "Central bank independence, inflation and political instability in developing countries," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 135-147.
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    6. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    7. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    8. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
    9. Mangano, Gabriel, 1998. "Measuring Central Bank Independence: A Tale of Subjectivity and of Its Consequences," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 468-492, July.
    10. Wojciech S. Maliszewski, 2000. "Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(3), pages 749-789, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. JoAnne Morris & Tonny Lybek, 2004. "Central Bank Governance; A Survey of Boards and Management," IMF Working Papers 04/226, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2015. "Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1503, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Adolfo Meisel & Juan D. Barón, 2010. "Un análisis histórico de la independencia de la banca central en América Latina: la experiencia colombiana, 1923-2008," Cuadernos de historia económica 006406, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA - ECONOMÍA REGIONAL.
    4. Ilker Domaç & Eray M. Yücel, 2005. "What Triggers Inflation in Emerging Market Economies?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 141(1), pages 141-164, April.
    5. Cobham, David, 2010. "Monetary policy strategies, financial institutions and financial markets in the Middle East and North Africa: an overview," SIRE Discussion Papers 2012-61, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    6. Cukierman, Alex, 2008. "Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions -- Past, present and future," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 722-736, December.
    7. Meisel, Adolfo & Barón, Juan D., 2010. "A historical analysis of central bank independence in Latin America: the Colombian experience, 1923-2008," Revista de Historia Económica, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(01), pages 83-102, March.
    8. Ilker Domac, 2003. "Explaining and Forecasting Inflation in Turkey," Working Papers 0306, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
    9. Ashoka Mody & Franziska L Ohnsorge, 2007. "Can Domestic Policies Influence Inflation?," IMF Working Papers 07/257, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Peter Montiel & Luis Servén, 2006. "Macroeconomic Stability in Developing Countries: How Much Is Enough?," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 21(2), pages 151-178.
    11. Alper, Emre & Hatipoglu, Ozan, 2009. "The Conduct of Monetary Policy in Turkey in the Pre- and Post-crisis Period of 2001 in Comparative Perspective: a Case for Central Bank Independence," MPRA Paper 18426, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Menji, Sisay, 2008. "Determinants of Recent Inflation in Ethiopia," MPRA Paper 29668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Piotr Stanek, 2004. "How to assess proposals for enlargement reform of the European Central Bank," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 91(5), pages 209-239.


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