Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Repullo, Rafael, 2004.
"Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 156-182, April.
- Rafael Repullo, 2002. "Capital Requirements, Market Power and Risk-Taking in Banking," Working Papers wp2002_0208, CEMFI.
- Repullo, Rafael, 2003. "Capital Requirements, Market Power and Risk-Taking in Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 3721, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rafael Repullo, 2002. "Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking," Proceedings 809, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Boyd, John H. & Chang, Chun & Smith, Bruce D., 2002. "Deposit insurance: a reconsideration," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1235-1260, September.
- Chang, Chun, 1999. "Capital structure as optimal contracts," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 363-385.
- White, Michelle J, 1983. "Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(2), pages 477-488, May.
- Edward J. Kane, 2000.
"Incentives for banking megamergers: what motives might regulators infer from event-study evidence?,"
Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 671-705.
- Kane, Edward J, 2000. "Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 671-701, August.
- Edward J. Kane, 2000. "Incentives for banking megamergers: what motives might regulations infer from event-study evidence?," Proceedings 675, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Daniel M. Covitz & Erik Heitfield, 1999. "Monitoring, moral hazard, and market power: a model of bank lending," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1999-37, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001.
"Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties,"
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June.
- David A. Marshall & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2000. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Working Paper Series WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, revised 2000.
- Gorton, Gary & Winton, Andrew, 2003.
Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.),Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 431-552,
- Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, 2002. "Financial Intermediation," NBER Working Papers 8928, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, 2002. "Financial Intermediation," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-28, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
- Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978.
"Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition,"
The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-438, July.
- John H. Kareken & Neil Wallace, 1977. "Deposit insurance and bank regulation: a partial equilibrium exposition," Staff Report 16, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Elena Carletti & Philipp Hartmann, 2003.
"Competition and stability: what's special about banking?,"
Chapters, in: Paul Mizen (ed.),Monetary History, Exchange Rates and Financial Markets, chapter 8,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Philipp Hartmann & Elena Carletti, 2002. "Competition and Stability: What's Special about Banking?," FMG Special Papers sp140, Financial Markets Group.
- Carletti, Elena & Hartmann, Philipp, 2002. "Competition and stability: what's special about banking?," Working Paper Series 146, European Central Bank.
- Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
- Gianni De Nicolo, 2000. "Size, charter value and risk in banking: an international perspective," International Finance Discussion Papers 689, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Damjanovic, Vladislav, 2013. "Endogenous risk in monopolistic competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 220-223.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2010.
"Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies,"
Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 156-168, September.
- Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2004. "Banks without Parachutes – Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2004. "Banks without parachutes : competitive effects of government bail-out policies," Papers 04-53, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2004. "Banks without Parachutes - Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 8, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2004. "Banks without Parachutes -- Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-53, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2013. "The foundations of macroprudential regulation : a conceptual roadmap," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6575, The World Bank.
- Noy, Ilan, 2004. "Financial liberalization, prudential supervision, and the onset of banking crises," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 341-359, September.
More about this item
KeywordsCompetition; bank risk shifting; banking; deposit insurance; bank risk; bank markets; Bank risk-shifting;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:03/114. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Hassan Zaidi to update the entry or send us the correct email address. General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.