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Is Policy Ownership An Operational Concept?

  • James M. Boughton
  • Alex Mourmouras
Registered author(s):

    IMF lending is generally conditional on specified policies and outcomes. These conditions usually are negotiated compromises between policies initially favored by the Fund and by the country''s authorities. In some cases the authorities might be satisfied enough with the outcome to take responsibility for it ("own" it) even though it was not their original preference. In other cases, they might accept the outcome only to obtain financing, in which case weak commitment might lead to poor implementation. This paper reviews the theoretical basis for the importance of ownership, summarizes what is known about its empirical effects, and suggests a strategy for strengthening it.

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    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 02/72.

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    Length: 31
    Date of creation: 01 Apr 2002
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:02/72
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