Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors At Failed Banks; Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and too-Big-To-Fail
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References listed on IDEAS
- Kane, Edward J, 1990. " Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 755-764, July.
- Demirguc-Kunt, Asl1 & Huizinga, Harry, 1999. "Market discipline and financial safety net design," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2183, The World Bank.
- George G. Kaufman, 1990. "Are Some Banks Too Large To Fail? Myth And Reality," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(4), pages 1-14, October.
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KeywordsDeposit insurance; Banking crises; Financial crisis; Systemic risk; bank failure; banking crisis; bank failures; present value; insolvent banks; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation;
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