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Inflation Targeting with NAIRU Uncertainty and Endogenous Policy Credibility

  • Peter Isard
  • Douglas Laxton
  • Ann-Charlotte Eliasson

Stochastic simulations are employed to compare performance of monetary policy rules in linear and nonlinear variants of a small macro model with NAIRU uncertainity under different assumptions about the way inflation expectations are formed. Cases in which policy credibility is ignored or treated as exogenous are distinguished from cases in which credibility and inflation expectations respond endogenuously policy credibility strengthens the case for forward-looking inflation forecast based rules relative to backward-looking Taylor rules.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 01/7.

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Length: 41
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:01/7
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