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Global Financial Crises; Institutions and Incentives

Author

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  • Manmohan S. Kumar
  • Paul R Masson
  • Marcus Miller

Abstract

Increasing emphasis has been placed on the need for an effective lender of last resort for sovereign states and on procedures for sovereign debt restructuring to help cope with global financial crises. Where private creditors use short-term debt to check sovereign debtor’s moral hazard, there is the risk of self-fulfilling crises. In this context, we conclude that the proposal of the Meltzer Commission—for unconditional financial support, but only to states that pre-qualify—could be the source of increased instability. After discussing analogies with private sector arrangements, we compare the operations of the existing Paris Club with proposed Chapter 11 style procedures.

Suggested Citation

  • Manmohan S. Kumar & Paul R Masson & Marcus Miller, 2000. "Global Financial Crises; Institutions and Incentives," IMF Working Papers 00/105, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:00/105
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Spiegel, Mark M., 2005. "Solvency runs, sunspot runs, and international bailouts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 203-219, January.
    2. Gai, Prasanna & Hayes, Simon & Shin, Hyun Song, 2004. "Crisis costs and debtor discipline: the efficacy of public policy in sovereign debt crises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 245-262.
    3. Thomas D. Willett, 2001. "Restructuring IMF Facilities to Separate Lender of Last Resort and Conditionality Programs: The Meltzer Commission Recommendations as Complements rather than Substitutes," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2001-28, Claremont Colleges.
    4. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
    5. Olivier Jeanne & Charles Wyplosz, 2003. "The International Lender of Last Resort. How Large Is Large Enough?," NBER Chapters,in: Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 89-124 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Peter Clark & Haizhou Huang, 2006. "International Financial Contagion and the Fund —A Theoretical Framework," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 399-422, December.
    7. Manmohan S. Kumar & Avinash Persaud, 2001. "Pure Contagion and Investors Shifting Risk Appetite; Analytical Issues and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 01/134, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Peter B. Clark & Haizhou Huang, 2001. "International Financial Contagion and the IMF; A Theoretical Framework," IMF Working Papers 01/137, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Hamdaoui, Mekki, 2016. "Are systemic banking crises in developed and developing countries predictable?," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 37, pages 114-138.

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