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Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: risk-sharing versus risk-pooling


  • Elena Del Rey

    () (Universitat de Girona)

  • María Racionero

    () (Australian National University)


This paper analyses the choice between risk-sharing and risk-pooling income-contingent loans for higher education of risk-averse individuals who differ in their ability to benefit from education and inherited wealth. The paper identifies the possible outcomes of a majority vote between the two income-contingent schemes and provides several examples where the risk-pooling income-contingent loan is preferred. The paper then discusses the implications on participation and voting outcomes if successful graduates are mobile and provides examples where the riskpooling income-contingent loan remains being preferred. Risk-pooling schemes can however be prone to adverse selection problems, particularly if students are mobile. The paper explores the implications of allowing students to opt out of the riskpooling income-contingent loan for a pure loan. It shows that risk-pooling income-contingent loans can be sustained even when some students opt out.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Del Rey & María Racionero, 2014. "Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: risk-sharing versus risk-pooling," Working Papers 2014/7, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  • Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2013/6/doc2014-7

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Poutvaara, Panu, 2001. "Alternative tax constitutions and risky education in a federation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 355-377, April.
    2. Kemnitz, Alexander, 2005. "Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees," Discussion Papers 617, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
    3. Gabrielle Demange & Robert Fenge & Silke Uebelmesser, 2014. "Financing Higher Education in a Mobile World," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 343-371, June.
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    5. Panu Poutvaara, 2008. "Public and Private Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate and Teaching to Stay?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(3), pages 591-608, September.
    6. Del Rey, Elena & Racionero, María, 2010. "Financing schemes for higher education," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 104-113, March.
    7. Panu Poutvaara, 2004. "Educating Europe: Should Public Education be Financed with Graduate Taxes or Income-contingent Loans?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 50(4), pages 663-684.
    8. Elena Del Rey & María Racionero, 2012. "Voting On Income‐Contingent Loans For Higher Education," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(s1), pages 38-50, June.
    9. Rainald Borck & Martin Wimbersky, 2014. "Political economics of higher education finance," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 115-139, January.
    10. Thomas Lange, 2009. "Public Funding of Higher Education when Students and Skilled Workers are Mobile," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 65(2), pages 178-199, June.
    11. Chapman, Bruce, 2006. "Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: International Reforms," Handbook of the Economics of Education, Elsevier.
    12. Elena Del Rey, 2011. "Deferring higher education fees without relying on contributions from non-students," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(5), pages 510-521, May.
    13. Dan Anderberg & Alessandro Balestrino, 2008. "The Political Economy of Post-Compulsory Education Policy with Endogenous Credit Constraints," CESifo Working Paper Series 2304, CESifo Group Munich.
    14. De Fraja, Gianni, 2001. "Education Policies: Equity, Efficiency and Voting Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(471), pages 104-119, May.
    15. Nerlove, Marc L, 1975. "Some Problems in the Use of Income-contingent Loans for the Finance of Higher Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(1), pages 157-183, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe De Donder & Francisco Martinez-Mora, 2015. "On the Political Economy of University Admission Standards," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/11, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
    2. Marcel Gérard & Silke Übelmesser, 2013. "Globalization and Access to Higher Education – Policy Implications," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(2), pages 03-10, 07.
    3. Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2016. "Student Loans: When is Risk Sharing Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5718, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Silke Uebelmesser & Marcel Gérard, 2014. "Financing Higher Education when Students and Graduates are Internationally Mobile," Jena Economic Research Papers 2014-009, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    5. Haupt, Alexander & Krieger, Tim & Lange, Thomas, 2013. "Education policy, student migration, and brain gain," Discussion Paper Series 2013-05, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
    6. repec:eee:pubeco:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. De Donder, Philippe & Martinez-Mora, Francisco, 2017. "The political economy of higher education admission standards and participation gap," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 1-9.

    More about this item


    Voting; higher education; income-contingent loans; risk; mobility;

    JEL classification:

    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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