Vertical externalities with lump-sum taxes: how much difference does unemployment make?
This paper analyses how the existence of unemployment affects the conventional approach to vertical externalities. We discuss the optimality rule for the provision of public inputs both in an unitary and a federal country. Our findings show that decentralizing the spending responsability on public inputs can bring its optimality rule closer to the production efficiency condition. Moreover, we describe the inability of the federal government, behaving as Stackelberg leader, to replicate the unitary outcome, unless to have new policy instruments at government’s disposal.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 93 403 46 46
Fax: 93 403 98 32
Web page: http://www.ieb.ub.edu
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robin Boadway & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2006.
"A Theory of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance,"
1072, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Motohiro Sato, 2000. "Fiscal Externalities and Efficient Transfers in a Federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 119-139, March.
- Diego Martinez & Tomas Sjögren, 2009.
"Can Labor Market Imperfections Cause Overprovision of Public Inputs?,"
09.13, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Martinez, Diego & Sjögren, Tomas, 2013. "Can Labor Market Imperfections Cause Overprovision of Public Inputs?," Umeå Economic Studies 858, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Kotsogiannis, Christos & Martinez, Diego, 2008.
"Ad valorem taxes and the fiscal gap in federations,"
Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 431-434, June.
- Christos Kotsogiannis & Diego Martinez, 2007. "Ad Valorem Taxes and the Fiscal Gap in Federations," Discussion Papers 0703, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Diego Martínez, 2007.
"Optimal federal taxes with public inputs,"
07.16, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Dahlby, Bev & Wilson, Leonard S., 2003. "Vertical fiscal externalities in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 917-930, May.
- Ogawa, Hikaru & Sato, Yasuhiro & Tamai, Toshiki, 2006. "A note on unemployment and capital tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 350-356, September.
- Robin Boadway & Jean-François Tremblay, 2006. "A Theory of Fiscal Imbalance," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(1), pages 1-27, March.
- Michael Keen, 1997.
"Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism,"
IMF Working Papers
97/173, International Monetary Fund.
- Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
- Diego Martinez & A. Sanchez, 2010. "A note on the optimal level of public inputs," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 363-369, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2012/6/doc2012-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.