Vertical externalities with lump-sum taxes: how much difference does unemployment make?
This paper analyses how the existence of unemployment affects the conventional approach to vertical externalities. We discuss the optimality rule for the provision of public inputs both in an unitary and a federal country. Our findings show that decentralizing the spending responsability on public inputs can bring its optimality rule closer to the production efficiency condition. Moreover, we describe the inability of the federal government, behaving as Stackelberg leader, to replicate the unitary outcome, unless to have new policy instruments at government’s disposal.
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- Diego Martínez, 2008.
"Optimal Federal Taxes with Public Inputs,"
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis,
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 64(4), pages 422-433, December.
- Diego Martínez, 2007. "Optimal federal taxes with public inputs," Working Papers 07.16, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Diego Martinez & A. Sanchez, 2010. "A note on the optimal level of public inputs," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(3), pages 363-369, March.
- Diego Martinez & Tomas Sjögren, 2009. "Can Labor Market Imperfections Cause Overprovision of Public Inputs?," Working Papers 09.13, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Martinez, Diego & Sjögren, Tomas, 2013. "Can Labor Market Imperfections Cause Overprovision of Public Inputs?," Umeå Economic Studies 858, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Dahlby, Bev & Wilson, Leonard S., 2003. "Vertical fiscal externalities in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 917-930, May.
- Robin Boadway & Jean-François Tremblay, 2006. "A Theory of Fiscal Imbalance," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(1), pages 1-27, March.
- Kotsogiannis, Christos & Martinez, Diego, 2008. "Ad valorem taxes and the fiscal gap in federations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 431-434, June.
- Christos Kotsogiannis & Diego Martinez, 2007. "Ad Valorem Taxes and the Fiscal Gap in Federations," Discussion Papers 0703, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Robin Boadway & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2005. "A Theory of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance," Working Papers 2006-04, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
- Robin Boadway & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2006. "A Theory of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance," Working Papers 1072, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
- Ogawa, Hikaru & Sato, Yasuhiro & Tamai, Toshiki, 2006. "A note on unemployment and capital tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 350-356, September.
- Motohiro Sato, 2000. "Fiscal Externalities and Efficient Transfers in a Federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(2), pages 119-139, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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