Should tax bases overlap in a federation with lobbying?
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- Sandro Brusco & Luca Colombo & Umberto Galmarini, 2010.
"Local Governments Tax Autonomy, Lobbying, and Welfare,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
10-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- Sandro Brusco & Luca Colombo & Umberto Galmarini, 2010. "Local Governments Tax Autonomy, Lobbying, and Welfare," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0097, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
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Keywordsvertical tax externalities; tax assignment; lobbying; specific taxation;
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2010-05-02 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2010-05-02 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-05-02 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2010-05-02 (Public Finance)
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