IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Efficiency and elusion: both sides of public enterprises in Spain

  • Roberto Fernández Llera

    ()

    (Universidad de Oviedo)

  • María A. García Valiñas

    ()

    (Toulouse School of Economics INRA (LERNA))

The main objective of this research consists on analyzing regional public sector enterprises (PSEs) in Spain. We describe a general view on Spanish Autonomous Communities (ACs) financial resources, in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact and Budgetary Stability Act. From 2002, such regulation imposes several constraints to ACs’ indebtness. In this paper, we find out about the roll of PSEs as an alternative way to traditional debt mechanisms. Thus, according to Eurostat criteria, PSEs’ debt can be taken off the public sector’s consolidated budget. Descriptive and econometric results confirm our expectations. ACs’ have used public enterprises to avoid the stringent financial rules. Additionally, it seems that low productivity ACs are accumulating more public debt outside the scope of consolidation. The paper concludes with some recommendations and policy implications.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://ieb.ub.edu/aplicacio/fitxers/2010/4/Doc2010-5.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2010/5.

as
in new window

Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2010/4/doc2010-5
Contact details of provider: Postal: Carrer del Tinent Coronel Valenzuela 1-11, 08034 Barcelona
Phone: 93 403 46 46
Fax: 93 403 98 32
Web page: http://www.ieb.ub.edu
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Michael Marlow & David Joulfaian, 1989. "The determinants of off-budget activity of state and local governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 113-123, November.
  2. von Hagen, Jurgen, 1991. "A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 199-210, March.
  3. de Palma, André & Thisse, Jacques-François, 1995. "Privatization and Efficiency in a Differentiated Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 1136, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Arulampalam, Wiji & Dasgupta, Sugato & Dhillon, Amrita & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 103-119, January.
  5. Ali Bayar & Bram Smeets, 2009. "Economic, Political and Institutional Determinants of Budget Deficits in the European Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 2611, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Xiujian Chen & Shu Lin & W. Robert Reed, 2010. "A Monte Carlo evaluation of the efficiency of the PCSE estimator," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 7-10, January.
  7. John Merrifield, 1994. "Factors That Influence the Level of Underground Government," Public Finance Review, , vol. 22(4), pages 462-482, October.
  8. Ann P. Bartel & Ann E. Harrison, 2005. "Ownership Versus Environment: Disentangling the Sources of Public-Sector Inefficiency," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(1), pages 135-147, February.
  9. Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2000. "Good, Bad or Ugly?on the Effects of Fiscal Rules with Creative Accounting," IMF Working Papers 00/172, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Víctor M. Giménez García, 2004. "Un modelo FDH para la medida de la eficiencia en costes de los departamentos universitarios," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 168(1), pages 69-92, march.
  11. De Borger, Bruno & Kerstens, Kristiaan, 1996. "Cost efficiency of Belgian local governments: A comparative analysis of FDH, DEA, and econometric approaches," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 145-170, April.
  12. Polackova, Hana, 1998. "Contingent government liabilities : a hidden risk for fiscal stability," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1989, The World Bank.
  13. Willner, Johan, 2001. "Ownership, efficiency, and political interference," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 723-748, November.
  14. David M. Drukker, 2003. "Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-data models," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 3(2), pages 168-177, June.
  15. James Bennett & Thomas Dilorenzo, 1982. "Off-budget activities of local government: The bane of the tax revolt," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 333-342, January.
  16. Lott, John Jr., 1990. "Predation by public enterprises," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 237-251, November.
  17. Xiujian Chen & Shu Lin & W. Robert Reed, 2005. "Another Look At What To Do With Time-Series Cross-Section Data," Econometrics 0506004, EconWPA.
  18. Kiewiet, D Roderick & Szakaly, Kristin, 1996. "Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 62-97, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2010/4/doc2010-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.