Politics or mobility? Evidence from us excise taxation
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More about this item
KeywordsTax competition; political accountability; excise taxes;
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2010-05-02 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-05-02 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2010-05-02 (Public Finance)
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