On the political economy of tax limits
We study the political economy of state limitations on the taxing powers of local governments, investigating the effects of such restriction on housing markets, community composition, and types of taxes and expenditures undertaken by local governments. We characterize equilibrium when voters choose values of multiple policy (tax and expenditure) instruments, finding that tax limitations have very substantial effects on housing prices and the composition of communities. Political support for tax limits comes from suburban voters and from a subset of central-city voters. Support for tax limits come even from residents of communities that are not constrained by the limits.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
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