Why do small states receive more federal money? Us senate representation and the allocation of federal budget
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- Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2013. "Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 257-282, November.
- Leonzio Rizzo & Valentino Larcinese & Cecilia Testa, 2012. "Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? US Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget," Working Papers 201215, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywordsfederal budget; malapportionment; small state advantage; overrepresentation.;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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