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Suggesting an alternative electoral proportional system. Blank votes count

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  • Orestis Troumpounis

    () (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

Abstract

I consider a two-party parliamentary election where parties compete on a quality (or valence) dimension. First I motivate why in such an election a voter may decide to cast a blank vote. Second I define a new voting system, inspired in the standard proportional representation system, where the percentage of blank votes is translated into vacant seats in the parliament. I analyze party competition assuming adapted versions of the models of “Bertand” and “Cournot”. I compare the equilibrium outcomes on parties’ quality and profits obtained with both the alternative proportional system and the standard one. I show that society and parties may have interests in conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Orestis Troumpounis, 2009. "Suggesting an alternative electoral proportional system. Blank votes count," Working Papers 2009/30, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  • Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2009/10/doc2009-30
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 131-161, March.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:62:y:1968:i:01:p:25-42_11 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Timothy J. Feddersen, 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 99-112, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    electoral systems; blank voting; proportional representation systems; endogenous valence;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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