IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hig/wpaper/60-ps-2018.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Why Dismiss a Good Case? Dual-Purpose Judicial Institutions In Constitutional Courts Under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Ivan Grigoriev

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

The Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) has over time developed a practice of adopting so-called “positive dismissals” (Pozitivnoe Opredelenie) which complements (but also undermines) the existent formal procedure of only delivering decisions on merits with Rulings (Postanovlenie). The paper explores the uses of this peculiar practice. I show that Positive Dismissals are used by the Court to overcome the rigidity of the formal procedure where this is necessary for reasons of intraorganizational or political expediency. To do that I construct and analyze quantitatively a unique comprehensive dataset of all decisions handed down by the RCC roughly in the first two decades of its existence (1995-2015, N=22334). I show that “positive dismissals” are used whenever the case is deemed too important to be simply dismissed (for example, if it is submitted by a powerful petitioner), or when the Court cannot dismiss a case but wants to keep low profile to avoid political risks (for example, with the politically salient cases during election years).

Suggested Citation

  • Ivan Grigoriev, 2018. "Why Dismiss a Good Case? Dual-Purpose Judicial Institutions In Constitutional Courts Under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 60/PS/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:60/ps/2018
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://wp.hse.ru/data/2018/04/02/1164793665/60PS2018.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pepinsky, Thomas, 2014. "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(03), pages 631-653, July.
    2. repec:taf:ceasxx:v:63:y:2011:i:3:p:449-465 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Gely, Rafael & Spiller, Pablo T., 1992. "The political economy of supreme court constitutional decisions: The case of Roosevelt's court-packing plan," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 45-67, March.
    4. Gely, Rafael & Spiller, Pablo T, 1990. "A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 263-300, Fall.
    5. Raphaël Franck, 2009. "Judicial Independence Under a Divided Polity: A Study of the Rulings of the French Constitutional Court, 1959--2006," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 262-284, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Russian Constitutional Court; authoritarianism; constitutional review.;

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:60/ps/2018. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamil Abdulaev) or (Shamil Abdulaev). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/hsecoru.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.