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Efficiency, Policy Selection, And Growth In Democracy And Autocracy: A Formal Dynamical Model

Author

Listed:
  • Andrei S. Akhremenko

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Alexander Petrov

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

The main focus of this paper is the impact of efficiency losses, related to public capital stock, on the prospects of economic growth in democratic and autocratic political environments. We introduce a distinction between two types of efficiency loss: along with the loss of public capital during its accumulation, we take into account the process of capital stock depreciation. We demonstrate that the decrease in efficiency of any type makes the probability of long-run growth higher for autocracies; however, in the presence of high efficiency, democracies tend to perform better. The results were obtained by formal analysis and computational experiments, realized on the basis of an original dynamical model.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrei S. Akhremenko & Alexander Petrov, 2014. "Efficiency, Policy Selection, And Growth In Democracy And Autocracy: A Formal Dynamical Model," HSE Working papers WP BRP 16/PS/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:16/ps/2014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrei S. Akhremenko & Alexander P. Petrov & Egor A. Yureskul, 2015. "Cyclically Balanced Growth Paths in a Model of Economic Growth with Endogenous Policy Switching," HSE Working papers WP BRP 109/EC/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. Ilya Lokshin, 2015. "Total Factor Productivity and the Institutional Possibility Frontier: An Outline of a Link between Two Theoretical Perspectives on Institutions, Culture and Long Run Growth," HSE Working papers WP BRP 30/PS/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    dynamical formal model; policy space; democracy; autocracy; economic growth; efficiency; public capital;

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
    • Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy

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