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Bank supervision Russian style: Rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives

  • Claeys, Sophie


  • Lanine, Gleb


  • Schoors, Koen



We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives – individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) during 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately, and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, which suggests a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also found reluctant to with-draw licenses from banks that violate the individual's deposits-to-capital ratio as this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor confidence and systemic stability.

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Paper provided by Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition in its series BOFIT Discussion Papers with number 10/2005.

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Length: 63 pages
Date of creation: 05 Sep 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2005_010
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bank of Finland, BOFIT, P.O. Box 160, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland
Phone: + 358 10 831 2268
Fax: + 358 10 831 2294
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