IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia

  • Claeys, Sophie

    ()

    (BOFIT)

The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) assumes a wide range of functions not raditional to a central bank. In addition to the daily conduct of monetary policy, it acts as a regulator and supervisor of the banking sector. It is currently overssing the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme and is the main owner of Russia's largest commercial bank, Sberbank. As this additional functions may conflict with the CBR policy objectives, I review how the current design of the CBR deviates from the optimal allocation of regulatory powers within a central bank prescribed in the literature. I then empirically investigate the need for a supervisory body within the CBR. Using a simple Taylor rule framework I find that the CBR does not use its "hands-on" supervisory information to maintain financial stability, but rather to accomodate state-owned banks' balances.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/tutkimus/tutkimusjulkaisut/dp/Documents/dp0705.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition in its series BOFIT Discussion Papers with number 7/2005.

as
in new window

Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 08 Jul 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2005_007
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bank of Finland, BOFIT, P.O. Box 160, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland
Phone: + 358 10 831 2268
Fax: + 358 10 831 2294
Web page: http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Mayes, David G., 2005. "Who pays for bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 161-181, January.
  2. Glenn D. Rudebusch & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Policy rules for inflation targeting," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 98-03, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  3. Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1997. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence," Working Papers 97-32, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  4. Abdur Chowdhury, 2003. "Banking Reform In Russia: A Window Of Opportunity?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-601, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  5. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1999. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability ? An empirical investigation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2247, The World Bank.
  6. Di Noia, Carmine & Di Giorgio, Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-78, November.
  7. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "Prudential Supervision: Why Is It Important and What are the Issues?," NBER Working Papers 7926, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. William Tompson, 2004. "Banking Reform in Russia: Problems and Prospects," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 410, OECD Publishing.
  9. Martin Summer, 2002. "Banking Regulation and Systemic Risk," Working Papers 57, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
  10. Repullo, Rafael, 2005. "Liquidity, Risk-Taking and the Lender of Last Resort," CEPR Discussion Papers 4967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Demirguc-Kunt, Asl' & Kane, Edward J., 2001. "Depositinsurance around the globe : where does it work?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2679, The World Bank.
  12. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2002. "Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 471-485, March.
  13. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central To Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653, May.
  14. Alan Morrison & Lucy White, 2004. "Is Deposit Insurance a Good Thing, and If So, Who Should Pay for It?," Economics Series Working Papers 2004-FE-08, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  15. Robert Eisenbeis & Larry Wall, 1998. "Financial regulatory structure and the resolution of conflicting goals," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Sep.
  16. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  17. Edward S. Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100.
  18. Esanov, Akram & Merkl, Christian & Vinhas de Souza, Lucio, 2005. "Monetary policy rules for Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 484-499, September.
  19. Claeys, Sophie & Lanine, Gleb & Schoors, Koen, 2005. "Bank supervision Russian style: Rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives," BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  20. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  21. Peersman, Gert & Smets, Frank, 1999. "The Taylor Rule: A Useful Monetary Policy Benchmark for the Euro Area?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 85-116, April.
  22. Kahn, Charles M. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2005. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2107-2136, November.
  23. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  24. Repullo, R., 1999. "Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model," Papers 9913, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
  25. Richard H. Clarida & Mark Gertler, 1997. "How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 363-412 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
  27. Morrison, Alan & White, Lucy, 2004. "Is Deposit Insurance A Good Thing, And If So, Who Should Pay for It?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4424, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  28. Peresetsky, Anatoly A. & Karminsky, Alexandr A. & Golovan, Sergei V., 2004. "Probability of default models of Russian banks," BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/2004, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  29. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "What should central banks do?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 1-14.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2005_007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Päivi Määttä)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.