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Fiscal competition in a transition economy

The paper analyses fiscal competition for mobile capital between identical regions in a transition country. A framework similar to Keen-Marchand (1997) is used to analyse welfare effects of regional competition. It is shown that in very early transition when the share of the old sector is overwhelming, consumers in a transition economy may be better off in a competitive equilibrium. The decision-makers, however, would prefer to coordinate their fiscal policies.

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File URL: http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/tutkimus/tutkimusjulkaisut/dp/Documents/dp0401.pdf
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Paper provided by Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition in its series BOFIT Discussion Papers with number 4/2001.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 16 May 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2001_004
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bank of Finland, BOFIT, P.O. Box 160, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland
Phone: + 358 10 831 2268
Fax: + 358 10 831 2294
Web page: http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/
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  1. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, 1999. "Why Russian Workers Do Not Move: Attachment of Workers Through In-Kind Payments," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 283, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  2. Keen, M. & Marchand, M., . "Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1284, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  4. Clarida, Richard & Findlay, Ronald, 1994. "After Maastricht: Public Investment, Economic Integration and International Capital Mobility," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(243), pages 319-29, August.
  5. Castanheira, Micael & Roland, Gérard, 1996. "The Optimal Speed of Transition: A General Equilibrium Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 1442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Desai, Raj M. & Goldberg, Itzhak, 2000. "The vicious circles of control - regional governments and insiders in privatized Russian enterprises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2287, The World Bank.
  7. Wildasin, David E., 2003. "Fiscal competition in space and time," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2571-2588, October.
  8. George C. Tsibouris & Vito Tanzi, 2000. "Fiscal Reform Over Ten Years of Transition," IMF Working Papers 00/113, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "Government in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 385-410, April.
  10. Timothy Frye & Andrei Shleifer, 1996. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," NBER Working Papers 5856, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Jack High (ed.), 2001. "Competition," Books, Edward Elgar, number 1751, July.
  12. Maxim Boycko & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993. "Privatizing Russia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(2), pages 139-192.
  13. Mutsumi Matsumoto, 2000. "A Note on the Composition of Public Expenditure under Capital Tax Competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(6), pages 691-697, December.
  14. Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, . "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," Working Papers 97045, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  15. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
  16. Laura Solanko, 2002. "Fiscal competition in a transition economy," Public Economics 0209002, EconWPA.
  17. Irena Grosfeld & Claudia Senik-Leygonie & Thierry Verdier & Stanislav Kolenikov & Elena Paltseva, 1999. "Dynamism and Inertia on the Russian Labour Market: A Model of Segmentation," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 246, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  18. Brown, J David & Earle, John S, 2000. "Competition And Firm Performance: Lessons From Russia," CEPR Discussion Papers 2444, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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