IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/halshs-00455427.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

De l'oeuvre au produit culturel

Author

Listed:
  • Dominique Sagot-Duvauroux

    () (Granem - Groupe de Recherche ANgevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - AGROCAMPUS OUEST - Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage)

Abstract

Après avoir présenté les différentes façons d'opposer œuvre et produit culturel, cet article propose une lecture économique de cette opposition faisant du produit culturel, la traduction marchande de l'œuvre. Le passage de l'œuvre au produit opère une transformation de la création originale d'autant plus importante que les acteurs de l'aval de la filière (producteurs, distributeurs, difffuseurs) seront intervenus sur le contenu de l'œuvre.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Sagot-Duvauroux, 2008. "De l'oeuvre au produit culturel," Working Papers halshs-00455427, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00455427 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00455427
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00455427/document
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raphaëlle Bellando & Françoise Le Quere & Franceline Mercurelli & Jean-Paul Pollin & Sébastien Ringuedé & Linh Tran Dieu & Anne-Gaël Vaubourg, 2007. "La gestion déléguée d'actifs financiers : théorie, observation, enjeux," Post-Print halshs-00225031, HAL.
    2. Raphaëlle Bellando & Françoise Le Quere & Franceline Mercurelli & Jean-Paul Pollin & Sébastien Ringuedé & Linh Tran Dieu & Anne-Gaël Vaubourg, 2007. "La gestion déléguée d'actifs financiers : théorie, observations, enjeux," Post-Print halshs-00287851, HAL.
    3. Jennifer N. Carpenter, 2000. "Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 2311-2331, October.
    4. Ippolito, Richard A, 1992. "Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 45-70, April.
    5. William N. Goetzmann & Nadav Peles, 1997. "Cognitive Dissonance And Mutual Fund Investors," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 145-158, June.
    6. Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
    7. Grinblatt, Mark & Titman, Sheridan D, 1989. "Mutual Fund Performance: An Analysis of Quarterly Portfolio Holdings," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(3), pages 393-416, July.
    8. Stephen A. Ross, 2004. "Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(1), pages 207-225, February.
    9. Barberis, Nicholas & Thaler, Richard, 2003. "A survey of behavioral finance," Handbook of the Economics of Finance,in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 1053-1128 Elsevier.
    10. Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber & Christopher R. Blake, 2003. "Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 779-804, April.
    11. Karceski, Jason, 2002. "Returns-Chasing Behavior, Mutual Funds, and Beta's Death," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(04), pages 559-594, December.
    12. Jennifer Carpenter, 1999. "Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-076, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    13. Goriaev, A.P. & Palomino, F.A. & Prat, A., 2000. "Mutual Fund Tournament : Risk Taking Incentives Induced by Ranking Objectives," Discussion Paper 2000-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. Raphaëlle Bellando, 2008. "Le conflit d'agence dans la gestion déléguée de portefeuille : une revue de littérature," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(3), pages 317-339.
    15. Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, 1998. "Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(5), pages 1589-1622, October.
    16. Palomino, Frederic, 2005. "Relative performance objectives in financial markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 351-375, July.
    17. Raphaëlle Bellando & Sébastien Ringuedé, 2007. "Compétition entre fonds et prise de risque excessive : une application empirique au cas des OPCVM actions de droit français," Post-Print halshs-00226341, HAL.
    18. Taylor, Jonathan, 2003. "Risk-taking behavior in mutual fund tournaments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 373-383, March.
    19. Brown, Keith C & Harlow, W V & Starks, Laura T, 1996. " Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 85-110, March.
    20. Raphaëlle BELLANDO & Sébastien RINGUEDE, 2009. "Compétition entre fonds et prise de risque excessive : une application empirique au cas français," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 332, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    21. Livio Stracca, 2006. "Delegated Portfolio Management: A Survey Of The Theoretical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 823-848, December.
    22. Raphaëlle Bellando & Françoise Le Quere & Franceline Mercurelli & Jean-Paul Pollin & Sébastien Ringuedé & Linh Tran Dieu & Anne-Gaël Vaubourg, 2007. "La gestion déléguée d'actifs financiers : théorie, observation, enjeux," Post-Print halshs-00225031, HAL.
    23. Raphaëlle Bellando & Françoise Le Quere & Franceline Mercurelli & Jean-Paul Pollin & Sébastien Ringuedé & Linh Tran Dieu & Anne-Gaël Vaubourg, 2007. "La gestion déléguée d'actifs financiers : théorie, observation, enjeux," Post-Print halshs-00225031, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00455427. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.