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Reducing the debt : is it optimal to outsource an investment?

  • Gilles Edouard Espinosa

    (CERMICS - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Mathématiques et Calcul Scientifique - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - UPE - Université Paris-Est)

  • Caroline Hillairet

    (CMAP - Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées - Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Benjamin Jourdain


    (CERMICS - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Mathématiques et Calcul Scientifique - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - UPE - Université Paris-Est , MATHRISK - Mathematical Risk handling - INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt - INRIA - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC))

  • Monique Pontier

    (IMT - Institut de Mathématiques de Toulouse UMR5219 - UPS - Université Paul Sabatier - Toulouse 3 - PRES Université de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INSA de Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées de Toulouse - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT2 - Université Toulouse 2)

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    We deal with the problem of outsourcing the debt for a big investment, according two situations: either the firm outsources both the investment (and the associated debt) and the exploitation to a private consortium, or the firm supports the debt and the investment but outsources the exploitation. We prove the existence of Stackelberg and Nash equilibria between the firm and the private consortium, in both situations. We compare the benefits of these contracts. We conclude with a study of what happens in case of incomplete information, in the sense that the risk aversion coefficient of each partner may be unknown by the other partner.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00824390.

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    Date of creation: 21 May 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00824390
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    1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre M, 2006. "Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers 5643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre, 2011. "A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts," TSE Working Papers 11-228, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2008. "Partenariats Public-Privés : quelques réflexions," Post-Print halshs-00754284, HAL.
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