Reducing the debt : is it optimal to outsource an investment?
We deal with the problem of outsourcing the debt for a big investment, according two situations: either the firm outsources both the investment (and the associated debt) and the exploitation to a private consortium, or the firm supports the debt and the investment but outsources the exploitation. We prove the existence of Stackelberg and Nash equilibria between the firm and the private consortium, in both situations. We compare the benefits of these contracts. We conclude with a study of what happens in case of incomplete information, in the sense that the risk aversion coefficient of each partner may be unknown by the other partner.
|Date of creation:||21 May 2013|
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- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2008. "Partenariats public-privé. Quelques réflexions," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 59(3), pages 437-449.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre, 2011.
"A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts,"
TSE Working Papers
11-228, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- AURIOL, Emmanuelle & PICARD, Pierre M., 2011. "A theory of BOT concession contracts," CORE Discussion Papers 2011019, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre, 2011. "A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts," IDEI Working Papers 667, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre M, 2011. "A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 8323, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Pierre M. Picard, 2011. "A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts," CREA Discussion Paper Series 11-04, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
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