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Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Jesús FernÁndez-Huertas Moraga

    (IAE - Department of Economic Analysis, Francisco Tomás y Valiente - UAM - Universidad Autonoma de Madrid)

  • Hillel Rapoport

    (European University Institute - Department of Economics, PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

The current European Union (EU) asylum policy is widely seen as ineffective and unfair. We propose an EU-wide market for tradable quotas on both refugees and asylum seekers coupled with a matching mechanism linking countries' and migrants' preferences. We show that the proposed system can go a long way towards addressing the shortcomings of the current system. We illustrate this claim using the recent problems regarding relocation faced by the European Relocation from Malta program.

Suggested Citation

  • Jesús FernÁndez-Huertas Moraga & Hillel Rapoport, 2015. "Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-01304179, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-01304179
    DOI: 10.1093/cesifo/ifu037
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01304179
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús & Rapoport, Hillel, 2014. "Tradable immigration quotas," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 94-108.
    2. Tim Hatton, 2013. "The Slump and Immigration Policy in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 686, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    3. Timothy J. Hatton, 2004. "Seeking asylum in Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 19(38), pages 5-62, April.
    4. Timothy J. Hatton, 2015. "Asylum Policy in the EU: the Case for Deeper Integration," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 61(3-4), pages 605-637.
    5. Alessandra Casella, 1999. "Tradable deficit permits:efficient implementation of the Stability Pact in the European Monetary Union," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 14(29), pages 321-362, October.
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    9. Hillel Rapoport & Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2014. "Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas: a Policy Proposal to Reform the EU Asylum Policy," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/101, European University Institute.
    10. Friedman, Daniel & Ostroy, Joseph, 1995. "Competitivity in Auction Markets: An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 22-53, January.
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    12. Eduardo M. Azevedo & Jacob D. Leshno, 2016. "A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1235-1268.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    international public goods; immigration policy; EU policy; tradable quotas; refugee resettlement; asylum seekers;

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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