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Les régulations asymétriques dans les marchés énergétiques : efficacité, collusion et financement des coûts échoués

  • Cédric Clastres

    ()

    (PACTE - Politiques publiques, ACtion politique, TErritoires - Institut d'Études Politiques (IEP) - Grenoble - CNRS : UMR5194 - Université Pierre Mendès-France - Grenoble II - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble I)

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    Les régulateurs ou autorités de concurrence peuvent adopter des régulations asymétriques pour favoriser le développement de la concurrence. Ces régulations obligent l'Opérateur Historique (OH) à rétrocéder une partie de ses approvisionnements à ses concurrents pour favoriser la concurrence sur le marché final. Les régulateurs se doivent de déterminer le montant de capacités rétrocédées ainsi que le prix de rétrocession. Ce faisant, ils peuvent effectivement permettre l'émergence d'une concurrence forcée, en facilitant l'accès pour les concurrents aux capacités de production. Cependant, considérant les investissements lourds en infrastructures, des stranded costs peuvent apparaître. Les régulateurs se doivent d'adapter leur politique de régulation afin de maximiser le welfare et de réduire les pertes engendrées. Le succès de cette politique dépend de l'efficacité de l'OH.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00800264.

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    Date of creation: Mar 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00800264
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00800264
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