IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01549822.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the timing of political regime changes in resource- dependent economies

Author

Listed:
  • Raouf Boucekkine
  • Fabien Prieur

    () (EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Klarizze Puzon

Abstract

We consider a resource-dependent economy initially ruled by the elite. The transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite. The occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities, both being driven by the elite׳s redistribution and repression policies. First, we show that when a political transition is inevitable, the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office. Second, we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance, and how it relates to the elite׳s policies. More resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime, which may not be the case of a repressive regime. Finally, we interpret the Arab spring sequence in light of our findings.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Klarizze Puzon, 2016. "On the timing of political regime changes in resource- dependent economies," Post-Print hal-01549822, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01549822
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01549822
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Raouf Boucekkine & Carmen Camacho & Benteng Zou, 2020. "Optimal switching from competition to cooperation: a preliminary exploration," PSE Working Papers halshs-02434786, HAL.
    2. Raouf Boucekkine & Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio & Fabien Prieur, 2016. "A Lipsetian Theory of Democratization: Development, Education, Inequality, and Resources," CESifo Working Paper Series 6283, CESifo.
    3. Raouf Boucekkine & Rodolphe Desbordes & Paolo Melindi-Ghidi, 2020. "Education, neopatrimonialism, and revolutions," Working Papers halshs-02613158, HAL.
    4. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Chrysovalantis Vasilakis & Benteng Zou, 2018. "Stochastic Petropolitics: The Dynamics of Institutions in Resource-Dependent Economies," AMSE Working Papers 1810, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    5. Raouf Boucekkine & Rodolphe Desbordes & Paolo Melindi-Ghidi, 2019. "Particularism, dominant minorities and institutional change," Working Papers hal-02317663, HAL.
    6. Bove, Vincenzo & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2017. "Political repression in autocratic regimes," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 410-428.
    7. Ngo Van Long, 2019. "Managing, Inducing, and Preventing Regime Shifts: A Review of the Literature," CESifo Working Paper Series 7749, CESifo.
    8. Cordella, Tito & Onder, Harun, 2020. "Sharing oil rents and political violence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Boucekkine, Raouf & Piacquadio, Paolo G. & Prieur, Fabien, 2019. "A Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 269-291.
    10. Long, Ngo Van & Prieur, Fabien & Tidball, Mabel & Puzon, Klarizze, 2017. "Piecewise closed-loop equilibria in differential games with regime switching strategies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 264-284.
    11. Matata Ponyo Mapon & Jean-Paul K. Tsasa, 2019. "The artefact of the Natural Resources Curse," Papers 1911.09681, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    [No keyword available];

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01549822. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.