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L'attribution des licences hertziennes

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre-Henri Morand

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté)

  • Florence Naegelen

    () (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté)

Abstract

[fre] L'objet de cet article est d'évaluer sur la base d'arguments théoriques et de politique industrielle les différentes procédures d'attribution de licences du spectre hertzien. Après un historique des méthodes utilisées, nous comparons les procédures de sélection comparative et d'enchères, puis nous étudions les propriétés des différentes règles de mise en concurrence utilisables (enchères simultanées ou séquentielles, ascendantes ou sous plis cachetés) dans le cas de demandes unitaires. Nous examinons en particulier les possibilités d'apparition de la malédiction du vainqueur, de collusion, l'existence de prix de vente identiques ainsi que certaines règles complémentaires telles que la fixation d'un prix de réserve et nous montrons pourquoi le mécanisme de l'enchère ascendante simultanée tend à s'imposer dans la pratique. Puis nous considérons le cas de demandes pluri-unitaires et ainsi que les propriétés respectives des procédures d'enchères simples ou complexes dans le cas où plusieurs licences sont agrégeables. [eng] In this article, we use both theoretical and industrial policy arguments to confront different assignment methods for spectrum licenses. After a brief survey of the history of assignment practices, we compare comparative hearings with auction. Then, we present several auction rules and their properties when each bidder can obtain at most one license. We compare open and sealed-bid, sequential and simultaneous auctions. We point out in each case the sensibility to collusion, the occurence of the winner's curse, the prices convergence and more specific auction rules. We justify the wide use of simultaneous ascending auction. In the last section, we consider multi- unit demand and we compare simple and complex auctions, when bidders can aggregate more than one license.
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Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Henri Morand & Florence Naegelen, 2001. "L'attribution des licences hertziennes," Post-Print hal-01313453, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01313453
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01313453
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