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Efficacité des procédures d'approvisionnement avec prise en compte de la qualité

Author

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  • Pierre-Henri Morand

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté)

  • Lionel Thomas

    () (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté)

Abstract

In this paper, we design the optimal procurement mechanisms when bidders are privately informed on efficiency and on observable but neither verifiable nor contractible quality. We show that most of the optimal procurement institutions are mixed procedure implying both separation and pooling. Thus, the existing take-it-or-leave-it offers and procurement auction appear only as polar cases. Moreover, we show that separation and pooling may affect the allocative efficiency of the procurement in a counterintuitive way, such that a less bunching mechanism can be a more inefficient one.
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Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Henri Morand & Lionel Thomas, 2006. "Efficacité des procédures d'approvisionnement avec prise en compte de la qualité," Post-Print hal-01313438, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01313438
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01313438
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrick GIANFALDONI & Pierre-Henri MORAND, 2015. "Incentives, Procurement and Regulation of Work Integration Social Enterprises in France: Old Ideas for New Firms?," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(2), pages 199-219, June.

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