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Un modèle explicatif du vote FNSEA aux élections des représentants des chefs d’exploitation aux Chambres d’Agriculture départementales 1995 – 2001

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Dubois

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • François Facchini

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Abel François

    () (LAEP - LAboratoire d'Economie Publique - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Martial Foucault

    () (CEVIPOF - Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This article constitutes an extension of the economic voting field to the not yet explored domain of professional elections. It studies the vote in favour of the FNSEA at the departmental Chambers of Agriculture's elections from 1995 to 2001.This analysis shows that the vote for the FNSEA is positively related to the variations of farmers' income as well as to the number of new installations, exhibiting then an egotropic and sociotropic dimension of this vote. Furthermore, the support provided to the FNSEA varies according to the type of agriculture production. The Fédération thus obtains better scores in beet farming territories, whereas there is no specific trend in the vote of cereal farming regions. Finally, the low turnout at these elections gives a real advantage to the FNSEA.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Dubois & François Facchini & Abel François & Martial Foucault, 2009. "Un modèle explicatif du vote FNSEA aux élections des représentants des chefs d’exploitation aux Chambres d’Agriculture départementales 1995 – 2001," Post-Print hal-01286756, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01286756
    DOI: 10.4000/economierurale.827
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01286756
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kiewiet, D. Roderick, 1981. "Policy-Oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 448-459, June.
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