Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la théorie des mécanismes
Most economic decisions involve agents who do not share the same information. Suppose a planner wishes to collect the agents’ information and act for them. Is there a synthetic description of the set of all procedures available to the planner? Which are the criteria to be fulfilled by an optimal procedure? Is it possible to design a procedure which necessarily achieves a given outcome? These are topics in mechanism theory. Three prominent representatives of this theory, Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, have received in 2007 the Sveriges Riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Publication status:||Published in Revue d Economie Politique, Editions Dalloz, 2007, 117, pp.873-890|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00360749|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00360749. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.