Ability of greens and supergreens to influence environmental regulations
The goal of this paper is to explore the environmental policies introduced by the government that cares about the welfare of its citizens and the contributions from the lobby groups. Our addition to the topic of environmental lobbying is in modeling lobby groups, where we distinguish between local and global pollution. We showed that in some cases, the environmental lobbying might have a negative impact on the tax level, which is not true for the local lobbying. Even more interesting result shows that the presence of supergreens might increase the pollution level in the home country. Our results for the cooperative policies prove that the introduced tax will imply lower global emissions. We demonstrated that the asymmetries in some parameters will reinforce the tax levels in the case of national lobby and supergreens if the asymmetry parameter in the foreign country is larger.
|Date of creation:||05 Jul 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-00906165|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Avinash Dixit, 1996. "Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 375-388, Fall.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale,"
21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Conconi, Paola, 2003.
"Green lobbies and transboundary pollution in large open economies,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 399-422, March.
- Paola Conconi, 2003. "Green Lobbies and Transboundary Pollution in Large Open Economies," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5837, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995.
"Trade Wars and Trade Talks,"
3450062, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," CEPR Discussion Papers 806, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Papers 163, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1993. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," NBER Working Papers 4280, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1993. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Papers 1-93, Tel Aviv.
- Persson, Lars, 2012. "Environmental policy and lobbying in small open economies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 24-35.
- Toke Aidt, 1997.
"Cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy,"
Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 455-475, December.
- Fredriksson, Per G., 1998. "Environmental policy choice: Pollution abatement subsidies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 51-63, March.
- Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
- Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
- Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July.
- Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:dumas-00906165. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.