A Paradox of Plenty? Rent Distribution and Political Stability in Oil States
Resource curse theory claims that resource abundance encourages violent conflict. A study of 37 oil-producing developing countries, however, reveals that oil states with very high levels of oil revenue are remarkably stable. An analysis of the ways in which governments spend oil revenues identifies two distinct types of rentier systems – the large-scale distributive state and the patronage-based system – which are strongly linked to instability or its absence. However, some deviant cases, such as Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, illustrate the need for further research. Apparently, the notion of a “paradox of plenty” has neglected rentier mechanisms that avoid conflict.
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- Anne D. Boschini & Jan Pettersson & Jesper Roine, 2007.
"Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(3), pages 593-617, 09.
- Boschini, Anne & Pettersson, Jan & Roine, Jesper, 2003. "Resource curse or not: A question of appropriability," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 534, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Anne D. Boschini & Jan Pettersson & Jesper Roine, 2006. "Resource curse or not: A question of appropriability," DEGIT Conference Papers c011_050, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Paul Collier & V. L. Elliott & Håvard Hegre & Anke Hoeffler & Marta Reynal-Querol & Nicholas Sambanis, 2003. "Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 13938, September.
- Christopher Cramer, 2003. "Does inequality cause conflict?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 397-412. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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