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On the Endogenous Determination of Time Preference

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  • Gary S. Becker
  • Casey B. Mulligan

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  • Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1994. "On the Endogenous Determination of Time Preference," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 98, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:chices:98
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Kaestner, 1999. "Does Drug Use Cause Poverty?," NBER Chapters,in: The Economic Analysis of Substance Use and Abuse: An Integration of Econometrics and Behavioral Economic Research, pages 327-368 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Miravete, Eugenio J & Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, 2002. "Learning Temporal Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 3604, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Sander, William, 1998. "The effects of schooling and cognitive ability on smoking and marijuana use by young adults," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 317-324, June.
    4. Guest, Ross S. & Mcdonald, Ian M., 2001. "How Uzawa Preferences Improve the Simulation Properties of the Small Open Economy Model," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 417-440, July.
    5. Been-Lon Chen & Mei Hsu & Chia-Hui Lu, 2008. "Inflation and Growth: Impatience and a Qualitative Equivalence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(6), pages 1309-1323, September.
    6. Abhijit Banerjee & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2010. "The Shape of Temptation: Implications for the Economic Lives of the Poor," NBER Working Papers 15973, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Haaparanta, Pertti & Puhakka, Mikko, 2004. "Endogenous time preference, investment and development traps," BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2004, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    8. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 1999. "Why Is There More Crime in Cities?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages 225-258, December.
    9. Gastón A. Giordana, 2008. "Wealthy people do better? Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Time Preference Heterogeneity and the Effect of Wealth in Renewable Common-Pool Resources Exploitation," Working Papers 08-10, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jul 2008.
    10. Kirby, Kris N. & Godoy, Ricardo & Reyes-Garcia, Victoria & Byron, Elizabeth & Apaza, Lilian & Leonard, William & Perez, Eddy & Vadez, Vincent & Wilkie, David, 2002. "Correlates of delay-discount rates: Evidence from Tsimane' Amerindians of the Bolivian rain forest," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 291-316, June.
    11. Jordan, Jeffrey L. & Anil, Bulent & Herbert, Velma & Chatterjee, Swan, 2009. "Human Capital Investments in Education and Home Stability: Exploring Education, Homeownership and Poverty," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49320, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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