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Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes?

Author

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  • Stephen G. Bronars
  • John R. Lott Jr.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Stephen G. Bronars & John R. Lott Jr., 1995. "Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes?," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 118, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:chices:118
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Becker, Gary S, 1991. "A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influences on Price," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1109-1116, October.
    2. Schmalensee, Richard, 1984. "Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages 211-230, January.
    3. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    4. Locay, Luis & Rodriguez, Alvaro, 1992. "Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 954-965, October.
    5. Kahn, Charles M, 1986. "The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 275-294, March.
    6. Crew, Michael A & Fernando, Chitru S & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1995. "The Theory of Peak-Load Pricing: A Survey," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 215-248, November.
    7. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
    8. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    9. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan & Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 371-383.
    10. Jeremy Bulow, 1986. "An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 729-749.
    11. Walras, L. & Holmes, P., 1980. "The state and the railways," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 81-100, February.
    12. Harold Hotelling, 1932. "Edgeworth's Taxation Paradox and the Nature of Demand and Supply Functions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40, pages 577-577.
    13. William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-498.
    14. Lott, John R, Jr & Roberts, Russell D, 1991. "A Guide to the Pitfalls of Identifying Price Discrimination," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 14-23, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Lott, 2006. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 263-300, December.
    2. RocĂ­o Albert & Francisco Cabrillo, 2006. "Gresham's law in politics: Why are politicians not the most remarkable men for probity and punctuality?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 99-112, April.

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