IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Politics and Deficit Finance


  • Holcombe, R.G.
  • Mills, J.A.


The government faces both economic and political constraints on its ability to raise revenue. Political factors can limit the government's revenue-generating ability to levels below those dictated by economic constraints. Taxation is more directly constrained by the political process than deficit finance because taxes are voted on directly by the legislature. Deficits are a residual that results from the aggregation of all tax and expenditure bills. Increased electoral safety weakens the political constraint against deficit finance because the only electoral check on deficit finance occurs when representatives run for reelection. Empirical estimates show that the increased security of incumbents has contributed to increases in deficit finance and has increased the overall level of public expenditures.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Holcombe, R.G. & Mills, J.A., 1992. "Politics and Deficit Finance," Working Papers 1992_03_1, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:fsu:wpaper:1992_03_1

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Thomas A. Garrett & Andrew F. Kozak & Russell M. Rhine, 2010. "Institutions and government growth: a comparison of the 1890s and the 1930s," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 109-120.
    2. Randall Holcombe, 2005. "Government growth in the twenty-first century," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 95-114, July.

    More about this item


    political economy ; tax policy;


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fsu:wpaper:1992_03_1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dmitry Ryvkin). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.