IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Strategic Exchange-Rate Policy of Accession Countries in ERM II

  • Christian Fahrholz

    ()

    (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Free University Berlin)

Exchange-rate policies of Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC) have often been a subject matter. Yet, some new insights in terms of political economy considerations upon exchange-rate policy are provided. It is pointed out that it is more appropriate to analyse exchange-rate policy in course of Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) with regard to a changing incentive structure. In doing so, considerable moral hazard problems become apparent. ERM II shall provide for an adequate level of convergence between prospective and current members of European Monetary Union (EMU). However, this institutional arrangement and, particularly, its impact on the incentives for exchange-rate policy making might enable CEEC to load considerable costs of convergence onto current members. Accordingly, the phase of ERM II is considered to be a bargaining on the distribution of costs of convergence between prospective and current members of EMU. In return, accession countries would offer to maintain public support for European integration. The CEEC’ leverage in this bargaining rests on brinkmanship, i.e. putting exchange-rate regimes at risk, thus possibly undermining the according public support. This paper delineates the basic assumptions and conditions for successful brinkmanship, points out the specific transmission mechanisms, and characterises this kind of exchange-rate policy as ‘threaten-thy-neighbour’. Overall analysis results in a cautious outlook on probable effects of such strategic exchange-rate policies on European institutional and economic matters.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ezoneplus.org/archiv/ezoneplus_wp_fourteen.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in its series Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers with number wp14.

as
in new window

Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2003
Date of revision: 01 Apr 2003
Handle: RePEc:ezo:ezppap:wp14
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Freie Universität Berlin, Ihnestrasse 22, D-14195 Berlin

Web page: http://www.jmc-berlin.org

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Mark Hallerberg & Lúcio Vinhas de Souza, 2000. "The Political Business Cycles of EU Accession Countries," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-085/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  2. Willem H. Buiter & Clemens Grafe, 2002. "Anchor, float or abandon ship: exchange rate regimes for the accession countries," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 55(221), pages 111-142.
  3. Barry Eichengreen & Ricardo Hausmann, 1999. "Exchange rates and financial fragility," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 329-368.
  4. Richard E. Baldwin & Joseph F. Francois & Richard Portes, 1997. "The costs and benefits of eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and central Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 12(24), pages 125-176, 04.
  5. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2000. "Fear of Floating," NBER Working Papers 7993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Michael Bordo & Barry Eichengreen & Daniela Klingebiel & Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, 2001. "Is the crisis problem growing more severe?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 51-82, 04.
  7. International Monetary Fund, 2000. "Exchange Rate Regimes in Selected Advanced Transition Economies; Coping with Transition, Capital Inflows, and EU Accession," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 00/3, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Fabio M. Natalucci & Federico Ravenna, 2002. "The road to adopting the euro: monetary policy and exchange rate regimes in EU candidate countries," International Finance Discussion Papers 741, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  9. Mishkin, Frederic S., 1999. "Lessons from the Asian crisis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 709-723, August.
  10. De Crombrughe, A., 2001. "Policy Options for Joining The Euro," Papers 226, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
  11. Alain de Crombrugghe, 2001. "Policy Options for Joining the Euro," LICOS Discussion Papers 10301, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
  12. Fabrizio Iacone & Renzo Orsi, 2002. "Exchange Rate Management and Inflation Targeting in the CEE Accession Countries," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp08, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 01 Aug 2002.
  13. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1996. "The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems," International Finance Discussion Papers 544, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  14. Willett, Thomas D., 2000. "Some Political Economy Aspects of EMU," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 379-389, May.
  15. Pieter W. van Foreest & Casper G. de Vries, 2002. "The Forex Regime and EMU Expansion," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-010/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  16. Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2001. "Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2542, The World Bank.
  17. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1037-1047, April.
  18. Baldwin, Richard & Berglöf, Erik & Giavazzi, Francesco & Widgrén, Mika, 2000. "EU Reforms for Tomorrow’s Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 2623, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Barry J. Eichengreen & Inci Ötker & A. Javier Hamann & Esteban Jadresic & R. B. Johnston & Hugh Bredenkamp & Paul R. Masson, 1998. "Exit Strategies; Policy Options for Countries Seeking Exchange Rate Flexibility," IMF Occasional Papers 168, International Monetary Fund.
  20. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rose, Andrew K, 1996. "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria," CEPR Discussion Papers 1473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Thomas D. Willett, 2001. "The Political Economy of External Discipline: Constraint Versus Incentive Effects of Capital Mobility and Exchange Rate Pegs," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2001-29, Claremont Colleges.
  22. Andrews, David M. & Willett, Thomas D., 1997. "Financial Interdependence and the State: International Monetary Relations at Century's End," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(03), pages 479-511, June.
  23. Vladimir Klyuev, 2001. "A Model of Exchange Rate Regime Choice in the Transitional Economies of Central and Eastern Europe," IMF Working Papers 01/140, International Monetary Fund.
  24. Jan Hanousek & Randall K. Filer, 2000. "Output Changes and Inflationary Bias in Transition," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp167, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  25. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "Inflation Targeting in Emerging-Market Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 105-109, May.
  26. Buiter, Willem H. & Grafe, Clemens, 2002. "Anchor, Float or Abandon Ship: Exchange Rate Regimes for Accession Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 3184, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. Jan Babetski & Laurence Boone & Mathilde Maurel, 2003. "Exchange Rate Regimes and Supply Shocks Asymmetry: the Case of the Accession Countries," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp206, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  28. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Thomas D. Willett, . "Some Political Economy Aspects of EMU," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2000-17, Claremont Colleges.
  30. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Juergen, 1990. "The European Monetary System ten years after," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 173-241, January.
  31. György Szapáry, 2001. "Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries during the Run-Up to EMU," Economics Working Papers 006, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes.
  32. Giancarlo Marini & Giovanni Piersanti, 2003. "Fiscal Deficits and Currency Crises," CEIS Research Paper 15, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
  33. Fabrizio Coricelli, 2002. "Exchange rate policy during transition to the European Monetary Union: The option of euroization," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 10(2), pages 405-417, July.
  34. Enrique G. Mendoza & Martin Uribe, 1999. "Devaluation Risk and the Syndrome of Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilizations," NBER Working Papers 7014, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ezo:ezppap:wp14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Stefan Hohenberger)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.