Reciprocal Altruism and Pension System in Overlapping Generations Models
We analyze equilibrium paths in two models of overlapping generations with reciprocal altruism. The first one allows us to consider a case of different propensity to of consumer to support her children and parents (non-symmetrical altruism). In this model, an equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. The second model describes a case equivalent to a situation, when two succeeding generations (not working parents and working children) have common budget. (in Russian)
|Date of creation:||16 Nov 2008|
|Date of revision:||10 Dec 2008|
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