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Legislative lobbying under political uncertainty

  • Michel Le Berton
  • Vera Zaporozhets

In this paper we develop a duopolistic model of legislative lobbying. Two lobbies compete to influence the votes of a group of legislators who have a concern for both social welfare and campaign contributions. The type of a legislator is the relative weight he/she places on social welfare as compared to money. We study the equilibria of this lobbying game under political certainty and uncertainty and examine the circumstances under which the policy is socially efficient, and the amount of money that has been invested in the political process. Special attention is paid to three primitives of the environment: the intensity of the competition between the lobbies, the internal organisation of the legislature and the proportion of bad and good legislators in the political area

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File URL: http://feb.kuleuven.be/drc/Economics/research/old-dps-papers/Dps07/Dps0710.pdf
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Paper provided by KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers Department of Economics with number ces0710.

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Date of creation: Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0710
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://feb.kuleuven.be/Economics/

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  1. Roger B. Myerson & Daniel Diermeier, 1999. "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1182-1196, December.
  2. James M. Snyder, 1991. "On Buying Legislatures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 93-109, 07.
  3. Mike Felgenhauer & Hans Peter Grüner, 2008. "Committees and Special Interests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 219-243, 04.
  4. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
  5. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
  6. Richard Boylan, 1998. "Private bills: a theoretical and empirical study of lobbying," Public Economics 9801002, EconWPA.
  7. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1997. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 5942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?," NBER Working Papers 9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2000. "Lobbying Legislatures," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  10. James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.
  11. Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2007. "Contests with limited resources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 738-748, September.
  12. Bradford, Scott, 2003. "Protection and jobs: explaining the structure of trade barriers across industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 19-39, October.
  13. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
  14. Le Breton, Michel & Salanie, Francois, 2003. "Lobbying under political uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2589-2610, December.
  15. Boylan, Richard T, 2002. "Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(1-2), pages 19-47, March.
  16. Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2003. "Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 278-295, November.
  17. Robert E. Baldwin & Christopher S. Magee, 1998. "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," NBER Working Papers 6376, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
  19. Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2003. "Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 114-133, July.
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