Listen to the Market, Hear the Best Policy Decision, but Don't Always Choose it
Real-world policymakers want to extract investors private information about a policy's likely effects by listening to "asset markets". However, this brings the risk that investors will profitably "manipulate" prices to steer policy. We model the interaction between a policymaker and an informed (profit-seeking) investor who can buy/short-sell an asset from uniformed traders. We characterize when the investor's incentives do not align with the policymaker's, implying that to induce truth-telling behaviour the policymaker must commit to sometimes ignoring the signal (as revealed by the investor's behaviour driving the asset's price). This implies a commitment to executing the policy with a probability depending on the asset's price. We develop a taxonomy for the full set relationships between private signals, asset values, and policymaker welfare, characterizing the optimal indirect mechanism for each case. We find that where the policymaker is ex-ante indifferent, she commits to sometimes/never executing after a bad signal, but always executes after a good signal. Generically, this "listeneing" mechanism leads to higher (policymaker) welfare then ignoring the signals. We discuss real-world evidence, implications for legislative processes, and phenomena such as "trial balloons" and "committing political capital".
|Date of creation:||01 Feb 2014|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.essex.ac.uk/economics/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Discussion Papers Administrator, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, U.K.|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Holger Breinlich, 2011.
"Heterogeneous Firm-Level Responses to Trade Liberalisation: A Test Using Stock Price Reactions,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp1085, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Breinlich, Holger, 2014. "Heterogeneous firm-level responses to trade liberalization: A test using stock price reactions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 270-285.
- Breinlich, Holger, 2011. "Heterogeneous Firm-Level Responses to Trade Liberalization: A Test Using Stock Price Reactions," CEPR Discussion Papers 8600, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kau, James B. & Linck, James S. & Rubin, Paul H., 2008. "Do managers listen to the market?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 347-362, September.
- Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1996. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1105-34, December.
- Robin Hanson & Ryan Oprea, 2009. "A Manipulator Can Aid Prediction Market Accuracy," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 76(302), pages 304-314, 04.
- Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997.
"Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?,"
NBER Working Papers
5893, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 97-116, Spring.
- repec:reg:rpubli:460 is not listed on IDEAS
- Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:748. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Essex Economics Web Manager)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.