Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination
We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff domination convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only support a limited number of links as compared to a scenario where agents are not constrained in their linking choice. The main reason behind this result is that whenever there is a small cluster of agents playing the efficient strategy other players want to link up to those layers and choose the efficient action.
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