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Dating Preferences and Meeting Opportunities in Mate Choice Decisions

  • Marco Francesconi

    ()

  • Mich�le Belot

Much empirical evidence shows that female and male partners look alike along a variety of attributes. It is however unclear how this positive sorting comes about, because marriage is an equilibrium outcome arising from a process that entails searching, meeting and choosing one another. This study takes advantage of a unique data set to shed light on the forces driving choices at the earliest stage of a relationship. Both women and men value physical attributes, such as age and weight, and reveal that their dating choices are assortative along several traits. Importantly, meeting opportunities are found to have a substantial role in determining dating proposals.

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File URL: http://www.essex.ac.uk/economics/discussion-papers/papers-text/dp702.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 702.

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Date of creation: 07 Dec 2011
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Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:702
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