IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Has More Independence Affected Bank of England's Reaction Function under Inflation Targeting? Lessons from Taylor Rule Empirics

  • Alexander Mihailov

    ()

This paper is an empirical investigation into the question of whether increased independence affects central bank behavior, in particular when monetary policy is already in an inflation targeting regime. We take advantage of the unique experience in that sense of the United Kingdom, where the Bank of England was granted operational independence from Her Majesty's Treasury only in May 1997, while inflation targeting had been implemented since October 1992. Our strategy is to estimate Taylor rules employing alternative specifications, econometric methods and variable proxies in search for robust results that survive most of those modifications. The key lesson we extract from UK quarterly data is that the Bank of England has responded to the output gap, and not at all to output growth, the more so after receiving operational independence, when the gap has been positive or close to zero and inflation credibly stabilized at target. We find no unambiguous evidence for any definite change in the Bank's reaction to inflation or in the degree of its interest rate smoothing. Our main import is to argue that both the asymmetry of the monetary policy reaction function across the cycle and the response to the output gap, not growth, are fully consistent with New Keynesian theory, especially under inflation targeting. Anchored inflation and economic expansion during the post-independence period thus complement greater autonomy in influencing the behavior of the Bank of England, yet clear separation of the individual contribution of each of these effects appears challenging given our short sample.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.essex.ac.uk/economics/discussion-papers/papers-text/dp601.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 601.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 11 Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:601
Contact details of provider: Postal: Wivenhoe Park, COLCHESTER. CO4 3SQ
Phone: +44-1206-872728
Fax: +44-1206-872724
Web page: http://www.essex.ac.uk/economics/

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Postal: Discussion Papers Administrator, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, U.K.
Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Alexander Mihailov, 2006. "Operational independence, inflation targeting, and UK monetary policy," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 28(3), pages 395-421, April.
  2. Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1997. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence," Working Papers 97-32, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  3. Sylvester Eijffinger & Eric Schaling, 1995. "Optimal Commitment in an Open Economy: Credibility vs. Flexibility," Bank of England working papers 41, Bank of England.
  4. Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2005. "The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1431-1475, 09.
  5. Clarida, R. & Gali, J. & Gertler, M., 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Working Papers 99-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  6. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1978. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1411-28, November.
  7. Paolo Surico, 2002. "Inflation Targeting and Nonlinear Policy Rules: the Case of Asymmetric Preferences," Macroeconomics 0210002, EconWPA, revised 09 Dec 2003.
  8. Hansen, Lars Peter, 1982. "Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-54, July.
  9. Forder, James, 2000. "Central Bank Independence and Credibility: Is There a Shred of Evidence?: Review," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 167-85, April.
  10. Robert G. King & Alexander L. Wolman, 1996. "Inflation targeting in a St. Louis model of the 21st century," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 83-107.
  11. Forder, James, 1998. "Central Bank Independence--Conceptual Clarifications and Interim Assessment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 307-34, July.
  12. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 431-48, July.
  14. Nelson, Edward & Nikolov, Kalin, 2001. "UK Inflation in the 1970s and 1980s: The Role of Output Gap Mismeasurement," CEPR Discussion Papers 2999, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Troy Davig & Eric M. Leeper, 2006. "Generalizing the Taylor Principle," Caepr Working Papers 2006-001, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  16. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 2002. "Central Bank Accountability and Transparency: Theory and Some Evidence," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 73-96, Spring.
  17. Martin, Christopher & Costas Milas, 2002. "Modelling Monetary Policy: Inflation Targeting in Practice," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 137, Royal Economic Society.
  18. Edward Nelson, 2000. "UK monetary policy 1972-97: a guide using Taylor rules," Bank of England working papers 120, Bank of England.
  19. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst & Fabio Ghironi, 2002. "Does It Matter (for Equilibrium Determinacy) What Price Index the Central Bank Targets?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 533, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 07 Feb 2003.
  20. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  21. Gerlach-Kristen, Petra, 2003. "Interest rate reaction functions and the Taylor rule in the euro area," Working Paper Series 0258, European Central Bank.
  22. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1998. "Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory," NBER Working Papers 6442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Jarkko P. Jääskelä, 2005. "Inflation, Price Level and Hybrid Rules under Inflation Uncertainty," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(1), pages 141-156, 03.
  24. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
  25. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Batini, Nicoletta & Yates, Anthony, 2003. " Hybrid Inflation and Price-Level Targeting," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(3), pages 283-300, June.
  27. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert King, 1997. "The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, Volume 12, pages 231-296 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Mehtap Kesriyeli & Denise R. Osborn & Marianne Sensier, 2004. "Nonlinearity and Structural Change in Interest Rate Reaction Functions for the US, UK and Germany," Working Papers 0414, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
  29. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. Efrem Castelnuovo, 2004. "Describing the Fed's conduct with simple Taylor rules: is interest rate smoothing important?," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 12, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  31. Robert Tchaidze & Alina Carare, 2004. "The Use and Abuse of Taylor Rules: How precisely can we estimate them?," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 132, Econometric Society.
  32. Muscatelli, V Anton & Tirelli, Patrizio & Trecroci, Carmine, 2002. "Does Institutional Change Really Matter? Inflation Targets, Central Bank Reform and Interest Rate Policy in the OECD Countries," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(4), pages 487-527, Special I.
  33. Henderson, Dale W. & McKibbin, Warwick J., 1993. "A comparison of some basic monetary policy regimes for open economies: implications of different degrees of instrument adjustment and wage persistence," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 221-317, December.
  34. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-70, December.
  35. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  36. Yun, Tack, 1996. "Nominal price rigidity, money supply endogeneity, and business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 345-370, April.
  37. M. H. Khalil Timamy, 2005. "Debate," Review of African Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(104-105), pages 383-393, June.
  38. Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn King, 1996. "Independence and Accountability," Bank of England working papers 49, Bank of England.
  39. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," NBER Working Papers 5893, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:601. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Essex Economics Web Manager)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.