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The Duration of Research Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence from the Eureka Program


  • Kaz Miyagiwa
  • Aminata Sissoko


In this paper we empirically investigate the factors determining the durations of research joint ventures (RJVs). Our theoretical model predicts that greater innovation values allow the partners to cooperate in R&D for longer durations. We test this hypothesis using data from the European Eureka program. Applying proportional hazards models and using RJV costs as a proxy for unobservable innovation values, we find support for the theory's main prediction. It is also found that RJVs with more partners tend to have longer durations and that firm-initiated RJVs have shorter durations than non-firm initiated RJVs.

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  • Kaz Miyagiwa & Aminata Sissoko, 2011. "The Duration of Research Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence from the Eureka Program," Emory Economics 1108, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  • Handle: RePEc:emo:wp2003:1108

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