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It's Now or Never: Deadlines and Cooperation

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  • Kaz Miyagiwa

Abstract

Cooperation among opportunistic agents often breaks down when agents cannot observe one another's actions. The standard remedy for such a problem is a two-mode approach pioneered by Green and Porter (1984), where agents switch back and forth between cooperation and punishment mode. Here, I consider use of a deadline as an alternative. I find that, under certain conditions, imposing a deadline can induce cooperation with unobservable actions and that the optimal deadline can pay off dominates the optimal two-mode strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaz Miyagiwa, 2011. "It's Now or Never: Deadlines and Cooperation," Emory Economics 1101, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  • Handle: RePEc:emo:wp2003:1101
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