International Harmonization of the Patent-awarding Rules
While the rest of the world issues patents to those who file applications first the U.S. do so to those who can demonstrate to have made inventions first. The U.S. has recently been under pressure to conform to the international rule. In this paper I examine the effect of international harmonization of the patent-awarding rules. In a dynamic two-country model of R&D competition for sequential inventions, I find that harmonization to the first-to-file rule can undermine innovation. This result is more like to arise if secondary innovations are relatively easy and their commercial successes are predominantly in the U.S. markets.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://economics.emory.edu/home/journals/|
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